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Abstract
It has often been suggested that retrocausality offers a solution to some of
the puzzles of quantum mechanics: e.g., that it allows a Lorentz-invariant
explanation of Bell correlations, and other manifestations of quantum
nonlocality, without action-at-a-distance. Some writers have argued that
time-symmetry counts in favour of such a view, in the sense that retro-
causality would be a natural consequence of a truly time-symmetric the-
ory of the quantum world. Critics object that there is complete time-
symmetry in classical physics, and yet no apparent retrocausality. Why
should the quantum world be any different?
This note throws some new light on these matters. I call attention to
a respect in which quantum mechanics is different, under some assump-
tions about quantum ontology. Under these assumptions, the combina-
tion of time-symmetry without retrocausality is unavailable in quantum
mechanics, for reasons intimately connected with the differences between
classical and quantum physics (especially the role of discreteness in the
latter). Not all interpretations of quantum mechanics share these assump-
tions, however, and in those that do not, time-symmetry does not entail
retrocausality.
1 Introduction
Many writers have proposed that some puzzles of quantum mechanics (QM)
might find elegant resolution, if we allow that there is retrocausality in the
quantum world. Perhaps most importantly, retrocausality has been claimed to
offer an attractive path to a Lorentz-invariant explanation of Bell correlations,
and other manifestations of quantum nonlocality, without action-at-a-distance
(see, e.g., [4]–[8], [10], [12]–[16], [22]–[26]). In general, it is a central assumption
of Bell’s Theorem [2] and other No Hidden Variable theorems in QM that there
is no retrocausality: that hidden variables (HVs) are independent of future
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measurement settings. Prima facie, then, admitting retrocausality might be
expected to make a big difference to the prospects for HV approaches to QM
– i.e., for the view that QM provides only an incomplete description of the
quantum world.
Some advocates of retrocausality in QM (see, e.g., [5], [6], [12], [17]) have
suggested that considerations of time-symmetry count in its favour: that if QM
were made “more time-symmetric,” retrocausality would be a natural conse-
quence. Against this, critics object that there is complete time-symmetry in
classical physics, and yet no apparent retrocausality. Why should QM be any
different?1
The main purpose of this note is to call attention to a respect in which QM
is demonstrably different, under some assumptions about quantum ontology.
Under these assumptions, a simple (and, so far as I know, previously unnoticed)
argument shows that a time-symmetric ontology necessarily puts the properties
of a system prior to a measurement under the control of an experimenter who
chooses a setting for the measurement in question. Moreover, the argument
turns on a feature of QM always thought to constitute one of the fundamental
differences between classical and quantum physics, viz., the role in the latter of
the new kind of discreteness introduced by quantisation.
However, the assumptions required by the argument are far from uncontro-
versial, and are easily seen to fail in a range of familiar interpretations of QM.
So the argument does not support the sweeping claim that time-symmetry in
QM requires retrocausality. But it does suggest that retrocausality is “close to
the surface” in QM, in the sense it is a direct consequence of time-symmetry,
under assumptions which many writers (past and present) would regard as well-
motivated, even if not indisputable.
Roughly speaking, the interpretations in which the assumptions fail are of
two kinds: (i) instrumentalist views of QM, which reject the kind of ontology
“between measurements” which is needed to provide a domain of retro-effects;
and (ii) all no-collapse versions of ontic realism about the wave function, which
remove the particular kind of discreteness on which the argument depends.
Leaving instrumentalism to one side, the crucial issue is whether the required
discreteness of measurement outcomes is regarded as “all there is,” or whether
continuity is provided elsewhere in the ontology of one’s model, e.g., in the form
of an ontic wave function (without collapse). In the former case – i.e., roughly, if
we are any sort of realist other than an Everettian or a Bohmian – the argument
shows that we do need to make a choice between time-asymmetric ontology and
retrocausality in QM, in a manner not true of classical physics.2 In this case,
the usual assumption that HVs are independent of future measurement settings
is incompatible with time-symmetry.
1I don’t know an example of this objection in print, but I have often heard it in person.
2The situation for Everettian and Bohmian views is less clear. There may be other reasons
to think that they cannot entirely combine time-symmetry and one-way causality. (I discuss
the case of the Bohm view in §7 below.) But they escape a particularly sharp argument for
the incompatibility of these options which applies to other realist views.
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Figure 1: The classical set up – right.
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Figure 2: The classical set up – left.
2 Polarization: classical and quantum
2.1 The classical case
We first consider the standard description in classical electromagnetism (CEM)
of the apparatus shown in Figure 1. A beam of light, linearly polarized in
direction τR, is directed towards an ideal polarizing cube set at angle σR. CEM
predicts that the beam will split into two output beams. The transmission
beam, here labelled R = 1, will have an intensity cos2(τR − σR) times that
of the input beam. The reflection beam, here labelled R = 0, will have an
intensity sin2(τR−σR) times that of the input beam. Thus in the case in which
τR = σR, all the energy goes on the transmission beam; in the case in which
τR = σR + pi/2, all the energy goes on the reflection beam; and other cases are
distributed between these extremes, in a continuous fashion. The transmission
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(R = 1) and reflection (R = 0) beams have linear polarization in directions σR
and σR + pi/2, respectively.
Figure 1 may be taken to represent a class of possible experiments, as τR
and σR are allowed to vary. It follows from the time-symmetry of CEM that
for any instance of this class there is a corresponding “reverse” experiment, in
the intuitive sense of “reverse” in which moving from A to B is the reverse
of moving from B to A. In an experiment of this reversed form, two beams
of linearly polarized light, with appropriate polarization angles, intensities and
phases, are combined into a single beam, on passage through a polarizing cube.
Figure 2 depicts a typical case of this reversed kind. The diagram has been
mirror-reversed compared to Figure 1 (thus preserving the convention that in-
puts come from the left and outputs go to the right), in order to make it easy
(below) to depict the case in which the output from an experiment of this re-
versed kind is used as input for a case of the first kind. The mathematical
constraints are exactly as one would expect from time-symmetry: if the input
on the transmission channel, L = 1, is polarized in direction σL with intensity
cos2(τL−σL), the input on the reflection channel, L = 0, is polarized in direction
σL + pi/2 with intensity sin
2(τL − σL), and the phases of the two beams are re-
lated exactly as in the original case, then there is an output beam with intensity
1 and polarization τL, in the direction of the input beam in the corresponding
experiment of the original form.3
2.2 The quantum case
Figures 3 and 4 show the quantum versions of these kinds of experiments, in
the single photon case. For the moment, to highlight the feature which will be
of interest, we assume that the outputs at R = 1 and R = 0 and the inputs
at L = 1 and L = 0 are now “discrete,” in the sense that the photon leaves or
enters the apparatus on one channel or other. (More later on the case in which
the input and/or output may be a superposition.)
The factors cos2(τR − σR) and cos
2(τL − σL) now represent probabilities,
rather than intensities. In Figure 3, a photon with polarization τR has a proba-
bility cos2(τR − σR) of being detected on the R = 1 channel, and a probability
sin2(τR − σR) of being detected on the R = 0 channel. (The intensity interpre-
tation is recovered in the limit, as the numbers of photons goes to infinity.)
There are some subtleties about what these probabilities amount to, on the
input side. Intuitively, we want to say that in Figure 4, a photon emerging with
polarization τL has a probability cos
2(τL − σL) of having entered the apparatus
on the L = 1 channel, and a probability sin2(τL − σL) of having entered on
the L = 0 channel. But such retrodictive probabilities are unreliable in many
circumstances. If we know that the only photon source lies on the L = 1 channel,
3If this seems surprising, keep the symmetry of the two classes of experiments in mind.
Each instance of the new kind is simply the time-reverse of an instance of the old, in the
intuitive sense mentioned above. If you were shown a video of such an experiment, with any
dissipative effects suppressed, you would be unable to tell whether the video was being played
forwards or backwards.
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for example, this information would incline us to say that the probability was
close to one that an emerging photon with polarization τL had come from that
channel, independently of cos2(τL − σL) (at least unless cos
2(τL − σL) ≈ 0).
We can deal with this issue by stipulating that we lack such information: e.g.,
by requiring that the choice of input channel is chosen at random, with equal
probability. In these circumstances, the factors cos2(τL − σL) and sin
2(τL −
σL) do supply reliable retrodictive probabilities – specifically, the conditional
probabilities of input on the R = 1 and R = 0 channels, respectively, given an
output of a photon with polarization τL, in the direction shown. (Again, the
intensity interpretation is then recovered in the limit, as the numbers of photons
goes to infinity.)
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Figure 3: The QM set up – right.
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Figure 4: The QM set up – left.
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Figure 5: The full classical set up.
3 Experimental control
We now consider the question of what can be controlled, in the CEM and
quantum cases, by experimenters who control only the polarizer settings, σL
and σR. The reason for this restriction on what the experimenters control will
become clear as we proceed.
3.1 The classical case
Figure 5 shows the CEM version of experiment we obtain by combining a pair
of experiments of the two previous classes. What interests us is the question of
what control, if any, the lefthand experimenter, Lena, has over the intermediate
polarization, if she has no control over the inputs at L = 1 and L = 0.
To put this question in stark form, imagine that the inputs L = 1 and L = 0
are controlled by a Demon, who knows what setting σL Lena has chosen for her
polarizer. It is not difficult to see that under these conditions the Demon can
produce any intermediate polarization τ he wishes, by an appropriate selection
of inputs. This follows directly from the time-symmetry CEM: the inputs the
Demon needs on the left are exactly the outputs Nature produces on the right,
with intermediate polarization τ and right setting σR = σL.
Lena’s lack of control of τ on the left, in the case in which the Demon controls
the inputs, is exactly mirrored for her sister experimenter, Rena, on the right.
The intuitive reason why Rena cannot control τ by varying the right polarizer
setting σR is that (as we just noted) Nature is able to make up for any difference
in σR by a difference in intensities of the output beams R = 1 and R = 0. In
this case, τ doesn’t shift, no matter how much Rena wiggles the setting σR.
This is why there need be no retrocausality in this case, of course.4
4For future reference, note that it does not follow that there could not be retrocausality.
To block retrocausality altogether, Nature must behave as the mirror image of the perfect
obstructive Demon. Imperfect Demons, who block some but not all forward influence on the
left, correspond to ways in which Nature might be, to allow some retrocausality on the right.
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To characterise this situation, I shall say that Lena has no input-independent
control of τ , and that Rena has no output-independent control of τ . The im-
portance of the notion of input-independence is that it mimics on the front end
of the experiment precisely the question we need to consider on the back end,
to think about the possibility of retrocausality. For on the back end, on the
right, Rena has control of the setting, σR, but not the outcome. As we have
just seen, the issue of retrocausality turns on the question as to what else Rena
can influence, if her control is limited in this way. Input-independence enables
us to think about the analogous issue at the front end of the apparatus, and
time-symmetry enables us to move from one case to the other. The next step
is to consider these issues in the quantum case.
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τL, τR
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Figure 6: The full quantum set up.
3.2 The quantum case
Figure 6 shows the analogous single photon case. (It will become clear in a
moment why we need to distinguish between τL and τR, in this case.)
For the moment, we are still assuming that the photon enters the apparatus
on the left on one channel or other. (In other words, that the Demon cannot
supply photons in a superposition of L = 1 and L = 0.) It is a striking fact
that in this case, Lena has more control over the left-polarization τL than in
the classical case, even if the Demon retains control of the inputs at L = 1 and
L = 0. Of course, the Demon can refuse to provide any photons at all, in which
case nothing emerges from the Lena’s apparatus. But if we assume that the
Demon shares with Lena the goal of emitting photons to the right, Lena now
has complete control of τL, mod pi/2. For if Lena sets her polarizer to angle
σL = τL, the Demon’s only choices are to send in a photon via L = 1, in which
case it emerges with polarization τL; or to send in a photon via L = 0, in which
case it emerges with polarization τL + pi/2.
5
5The physical direction of the L = 0 beam depends on σL, but this creates no additional
difficulty for the Demon, under our assumption that he knows what setting Lena has chosen.
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Thus in the notation introduced above, Lena now has input-independent
control of τL, up to an additive factor of pi/2, by means of her control of the left
setting, σL. Note that this additional degree of control on Lena’s part results
directly from restriction on the Demon’s options imposed by the assumption the
input photon be on one channel or other. In effect, Lena is attempting to con-
trol a continuously-valued output variable (τL) by manipulating a continuously-
valued input variable (σL). The Demon can counteract any such influence, if he
has an appropriate continuously-valued input variable of his own to play with,
as in the classical case above. But if the Demon is restricted to a finite, discrete
range of inputs – n, say, in the general case – then the best he can do is to group
the possible outputs into n-tuples, in such a way that Lena cannot control which
member of a particular n-tuple the output turns out to be; but can control from
which n-tuple the choice is to be made.
This restriction on the Demon’s abilities, and a corresponding restriction
on Nature at the other end of the experiment, will play a crucial role in what
follows; I shall call it Discreteness. I want to emphasise two points about
Discreteness, at this stage. The first is that although it is an idea which – at
least naively – seems at home in the quantum context, it doesn’t depend on the
quantum framework: we could impose Discreteness in the classical case, too,
by stipulating that the Demon can only use one input channel at a time. The
second is that I am not claiming that Discreteness is a realistic restriction, even
in the quantum case: on the contrary, as we shall see, we can restore continuity
in the quantum case, by allowing the Demon to input superpositions of L = 1
and L = 0. The real interest of Discreteness in the quantum case stems from
the fact that it does turn out to be a realistic restriction, at least under some
views of quantum ontology, at the other end of the experiment.6
We have seen that Discreteness gives Lena some input-independent control
of τL, on the left side of our experiment. What does it entail on the other
side of the experiment? In the classical case, we noted that Lena’s lack of
input-independent control of τ is mirrored for Rena, on the right. Rena has
no output-independent control of τ , so long as Nature absorbs any change she
(Rena) makes to the setting σR in changes in the output intensities (thereby
requiring no change in τ itself). As we noted, this is why there need be no
retrocausality in the classical case (despite complete time-symmetry).
To ask the corresponding question in the quantum case, it will be helpful
to make explicit another assumption, which I shall call Realism. It is that τL
is a beable, in John Bell’s sense. As Bell (3, p. 174) puts it: “The beables of
the theory are those elements which might correspond to elements of reality, to
things which exist.” Thus Realism is the assumption that τL labels something
real – some aspect of the ontology of the quantum world, as philosophers would
6To avoid a possible confusion, let me also stress that my use of the terms discrete and
Discreteness is not derived from the familiar distinction between discrete and continuous spec-
tra, in relation to quantum observables. The observables we shall be discussing are certainly
discrete (in fact, 2-valued) in the latter sense. As we shall see, however, this is compatible, in
some views of quantum ontology, with the outputs not being discrete in the sense relevant to
my argument.
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say. Some writers reject this assumption, in the quantum domain, at least in
the sense that they think that the quantum state should not be understood as
playing this role – more on this option in §5.1 below – but for now, I assume it.
With Realism in place, we can now formulate a further assumption, viz.,
Time-symmetry. It stipulates that the ontology of the system depicted in
Figure 6 be time-symmetric, in the intuitive sense introduced above: if a pro-
cess is permitted by the theory, then so, equally, is the process we describe by
replacing t by −t in a description of the original process – by “playing the video
in reverse,” in the familar analogy.
In the quantum version of our experiment, Time-symmetry thus requires
that there be an element of reality, τR, that stands to σR, R = 1 and R = 0
in precisely the way that τL stands to σL, L = 1 and L = 0. Why? Because
if there were not, the absence of such a τR in a complete description of the
experiment would easily allow us to tell whether a video of a particular run of
the experiment was being shown to us “forwards” or “backwards.” When it is
shown forwards, we see τL correlated with σL, L = 1 and L = 0 on the left;
when it is shown backwards, we appear to see τR correlated with σR, R = 1 and
R = 0 on the right. If Time-symmetry does not hold – and there is no such τR,
in fact – then the latter case cannot be veridical, but must result from reversal
of the movie.7
Note that the textbook model of QM, which combines evolution of the
state function in accordance with Schro¨dinger’s Equation with collapse in ac-
cordance with the Projection Postulate, is manifestly not time-symmetric, in
this sense. As is well-known, it is the Projection Postulate that introduces a
time-asymmetry. (It requires that the state be an eigenvector of the operator
corresponding to an observable after but not before the measurement in ques-
tion.) I shall say a little more about the connection between this feature of the
textbook picture and our present concerns in §5.3 below, but for the moment, it
means that the standard picture is simply off the map, for present purposes – of
no direct relevance to the issue as to whether if we do assume Time-symmetry
in QM, we are committed to retrocausality.
The assumptions Realism and Time-symmetry thus together make sense of
the presence of the term τR in Figure 6, and entitle us to regard it as a beable,
denoting an element of reality in just the way that (Realism entails that) τL
does. However, we saw that if we assume Discreteness on the left, Lena has
some input-independent control over τL, by manipulating σL. If we now assume
Discreteness on the right – i.e., if we assume that a single photon emerges either
at R = 1 or at R = 0 – then it follows by symmetry that Rena has precisely the
same output-independent control over the value of τR as her sister has over the
value of τL. She, too, can determine its value up to an additive factor of pi/2, no
matter what Nature does with the outputs on R = 1 and R = 0. In particular,
this means that if Rena changes the setting σR by any amount ρ 6= pi/2, this will
result in a different value of τR for any subsequent photons. In counterfactual
7It is not a relevant objection that no video could actually be made of such processes,
due to the obvious limits on observability. We simply need to imagine a computer-generated
movie, depicting the evolution of the assumed ontology.
9
terms, it seems reasonable to say of any particular case that if she had chosen
σR + ρ rather than σR, the value of τR would have been different. Intuitively,
Rena thus has retrocausal control over τR, mod pi/2.
As we wanted to show, then, time-symmetry does require retrocausality in
this case, for reasons not present in CEM.8 Once again, the heavy lifting is done
by Discreteness, for it is this that ensures that Nature lacks the range of vari-
ability required to absorb the difference of a change in σR entirely in the future.
Given the time-symmetric ontology required by the combination of Realism and
Time-symmetry, Discreteness makes retrocausality a simple consequence of the
dynamical laws.
Let us label this piece of reasoning the Time-Symmetry Argument for Retro-
causality (TSAR), and summarise its conclusions in the following form:
Realism + Time-symmetry + Discreteness⇒ Retrocausality.
4 Discussion
What is TSAR’s significance? At a minimum, I think, the argument provides an
interesting toy model, built from very familiar materials, that casts some useful
light on the complex relationship between time-symmetry and retrocausality.
The model begins with a case in which time-symmetry clearly does not require
retrocausality; and then shows how a simple restriction on the space of pos-
sibilities available to Nature (in Her response to an agent’s choices) can have
the effect of imposing retrocausality, if time-symmetry is to be preserved. The
model seems likely to throw some light, too, on the consistency constraints of
a retrocausal framework – as suggested above, the indeterminism in QM seems
to play a crucial role at this point.
But does TSAR have any direct application to QM? In particular, can it be
used to support the claim that time-symmetry in QM requires retrocausality?
The toy model shows how time-symmetry can require retrocausality, but is the
world described by QM the kind of world in which this is true; or more like the
world of CEM, in which it is not true? I want to conclude with some discussion
of these questions.
To focus the discussion, let me put on the table the following claim:
Symmetry-Requires-Retrocausality Thesis (SRRT): TSAR establishes
that a time-symmetric ontology for photon polarization is necessarily retro-
causal. Hence, if the quantum world is time-symmetric, it must be retro-
causal.
8As before, we could duplicate the result in CEM by imposing the restriction that the
output energy be entirely on one channel or other. However, without the flexibility provided
by indeterminism in the QM case, a time-symmetric CEM model of this kind would lead to
inconsistencies, in the sense that Lena and Rena could choose incompatible values of τ . The
distinction between τL and τR is needed to avoid this possibility in the QM case.
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I stress that I am not endorsing this thesis, but merely putting it on the table
for discussion. I am interested in what counter-arguments are available to its
opponents.
The most powerful objections to SRRT are those that question the status of
the Discreteness assumption on which TSAR relies, arguing that it is unrealistic,
at least in some interpretations of QM. I turn to such arguments in §6. Before
that, however, I want briefly to mention a couple of responses which take a
different tack, questioning the ontological assumptions of TSAR.
5 Ontological options
5.1 Avoid the ontology altogether
The symmetry argument does not go through if we deny that the usual quantum
polarization τL is a beable, or element of reality. Hence SRRT can certainly
be evaded by a sufficiently thoroughgoing instrumentalism about the quantum
world. This loophole is not available to proponents of the Hidden Variable
program, of course.9
The costs of this loophole should not be underestimated, however. One way
to see what some of these costs are is to note that the apparatus in Figure 6
can easily be used to signal, by an experimenter who controls both the input
channel and the left polarizer setting σL. Under these circumstances, τL would
normally be thought to be what “carries” the signal, or causal influence, from
one side of the apparatus to the other. Denying that there is any beable to play
this role seems to amount to accepting a kind of action-at-a-distance (though
timelike, rather than spacelike).10
5.2 Avoid the specific ontology of the example
A more subtle objection would be that the grounds for treating the usual quan-
tum polarization τL as a beable rest on the assumption that there is no retro-
causality. If the photon “already knows” σR, then it doesn’t seem to need the
full information carried by τL, in order to explain the correlations we find in the
full experiment, for variable σL and σR – perhaps there is no such beable as τL.
One way to see this is to exploit the symmetry of the experiment. This
symmetry entails that if the dependence of the correlation between L and R
on σL and σR can be explained (as in the orthodox picture) by postulating a
beable τL to “carry” information from left to right, it could equally be explained
by postulating a beable τR carrying information from right to left.
11 Since in
9It is not even available to opponents of HVs, in so far as they are interested in the project
of exhibiting supposedly undesirable consequences of the HV approach – in this context, they
cannot begin by denying their opponents’ basic premise.
10In [9], Evans, Wharton and I argue that this option should be regarded as analogous to
the standard view of spacelike nonlocality.
11A reason for preferring one explanation to the other would have to come “from outside”,
for the symmetry implies that it cannot rest on anything internal to the experiment itself.
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the former case the explanation of the correlation does not require τR, the
explanation of the same correlation by the latter means would not require τL.
The latter explanation, by means of τR, provides an extreme illustration of the
general point: by making information about the “future” end of the experiment
available at the “past” end, we thereby reduce the need for a beable to carry
information from past to future.
This is an important point, in my view. Among other things, it raises the
question as to whether a time-symmetric model should involve the two beables
τL and τR, or rather some single beable, dependent both on σL and σR (which
would combine the role of both τL and τR, so to speak). On the face of it, mod-
els with two beables seem to fail to exploit the ontological efficiency possible in
a retrocausal theory – a fact which might be held to be a disadvantage of retro-
causal models (e.g., those of [1, 24, 25]) which proceed by adding an additional
wave function (“coming from the future”) to standard QM, and interpreting
both wave functions in an ontic manner.12
As an illustration of the ontological economy possible in a retrocausal theory,
consider the following toy model. Replace the continuously-valued beables τL
and τR with a single two-bit binary variable – i.e., one of the four possibilities 00,
01, 10 and 11, where the first and second bits represent the left (past) and right
(future) input/output channels, respectively. Let the probability distribution
over the four possible values of this two-bit variable depend on σL and σR, in
accordance with Malus’ Law:
Pr(00 ∨ 11) = cos2(σL − σR); Pr(01 ∨ 10) = sin
2(σL − σR).
This model reproduces the predictions of QM (assuming Discreteness), and
hence demonstrates that if retrocausality is allowed, we need far less ontology
for the intuitive causal work of conveying information from one end of the ex-
periment to the other. In particular, we no longer need a beable to carry the
continuous information corresponding to the setting σL – in so far as it needs
to be (given retrocausality), that variability can be entirely absorbed into the
statistics governing a discrete variable.13
I think it is an interesting question whether the information structure and
hence the ontological economy of this toy model could be replicated in a realistic
physical model of the photon polarization case, or indeed of more complex cases.
For the moment, however, I simply want to emphasise the relevance of this
possibility to the present argument. On the one hand, it does reveal a significant
12Cramer’s Transactional Interpretation [8] seems to evade this objection, because its “offer”
and “confirmation” waves do not have the same ontic status as the two wave functions in the
models just cited.
13Indeed, we could economise even further, to a one-bit variable representing the “parity”
of the input–output channel comparison. If we map 00 and 11 in the previous model to 1,
and 01 and 10 to 0, and now stipulate that Pr(0) = cos2(σL − σR), we again get the correct
predictions. The difference is that in this simpler model the hidden variable “tells” the photon
in the future whether it should take the same or a different output channel, compared to its
input channel in the past, without telling it which input channel it took in the past. The
resulting correlations might then seem to involve “spooky action at a time-like distance,” in
comparison to those of the richer model.
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lacuna in TSAR, as I presented it above, at least in the sense that it makes
Realism seem ill-formulated: someone attracted to the approach described here
will claim to be a realist by disposition, in the sense that they take seriously
the question as to what exists “between measurements,” even though they do
not – as our version of Realism requires – assume that τL labels an element
of reality. On the other hand, however, this point carries no weight at all as
an objection to SRRT. An opponent of SRRT who sought to rely on it would
simply shoot herself in the foot, invoking retrocausality in order to block an
argument in favour of retrocausality.
5.3 Make the ontology time-asymmetric
Another way to escape the consequences of SRRT – i.e., to avoid a commitment
to retrocausality – is to make one’s ontology time-asymmetric. It is important
to be clear that this option is not an objection to SRRT. SRRT merely claims
that TSAR establishes that if the ontology of QM is time-symmetric, then it
is retrocausal. In other words, SRRT does not deny that we can avoid retro-
causality by abandoning time-symmetry. It simply maintains that we need to
make a choice between the two. This option concedes that we need to make a
choice, but chooses time-asymmetry in preference to retrocausality.
As I remarked earlier (§3.2), the textbook version of QM, with the Projection
Postulate, is an example of a model that exploits this option. I want to make two
notes in passing at this point. First, it is important to be clear that avoiding an
argument requiring retrocausality is not the same thing as demonstrating that
there is no retrocausality. I shall explore this distinction below with reference to
the de Broglie-Bohm model, but – as I shall note there (§7.1) – the same point
applies to the textbook picture: its case for thinking that the quantum world is
not retrocausal seems remarkably weak.
Secondly, our discussion above hints at an additional cost of the textbook
model, on top of the cost (if cost it be) of time-asymmetry itself. In §5.2
we exploited the fact a model with a time-asymmetric boundary-independent
ontology (i.e., in that case, with a beable τL to carry information from past
to future) could easily be transformed into a different model, the time-reverse
of the first, which would do an equally good job of explaining the correlations
observed on the experiment in question. Hence the threat: unless there is some
independent reason to prefer one model to the other – which would be, ipso
facto, a reason to expect time-asymmetry in the domain in question – then the
time-asymmetry will have introduced an undetectable fact of the matter, about
which of two kinds of worlds we actually inhabit. (In the terminology of §5.2,
is it a τL world or a τR world?) We break the symmetry at the cost of making
it undetectable which way it is broken. A time-symmetric model avoids this
consequence.
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5.4 Conclusion
The prospects for rejecting SRRT on ontological grounds are slim. TSAR can
be avoided by a thoroughgoing instrumentalism, prepared to deny the existence
of a physical reality14 between quantum measurements. Otherwise, however,
TSAR’s ontological prerequisites do not seem especially demanding. Quantum
realists will need to look elsewhere for an objection to SRRT.
6 Avoiding Discreteness?
So the best prospect for rejecting SRRT seems to lie with role of Discreteness in
TSAR. And on the face of it, a basis for challenge on these grounds is not hard to
find. As noted above, input-independent control disappears from the QM case,
if we allow the Demon the option of introducing a photon in a superposition
of the L = 1 and L = 0 cases. In this case, by an appropriate choice of input
amplitudes on each channel, the Demon can produce any τL he wishes, whatever
Lena’s choice of σL. (As in the classical case, this follows immediately from a
consideration of the time-reversed case, given the time-symmetry of the relevant
quantum dynamics.)
To avoid output-independence, and hence retrocausality, this option needs
to be available to Nature in Rena’s case. However, it may seem that Rena can
frustrate Nature, simply by placing photon detectors on the output channels.
Since such a measurement is guaranteed to yield either R = 1 or R = 0, rather
than a superposition of both, it seems that Rena can easily deprive Nature of
the flexibility needed to evade the argument for retrocausality.
But this argument is too quick. In effect, it depends on the assumption that
the measurement outcomes constitute the entirety of relevant output ontology
– in other words, the sole available reservoir, from Nature’s point of view, for
non-retrocausal variability, in the light of changes Rena may make to σR. Some
views of QM will reject this assumption, however. Everettians will certainly
do so, for example. In the Everett picture, there is in reality no single definite
outcome, whatever the appearances in any single branch. Rather, the photon
emerges from Rena’s polarizer in a superposition of R = 1 and R = 0, with
the mod-squared amplitudes for the two components provided by the factors
cos2(τR−σR) and sin
2(τR−σR), respectively. Once again, these factors restore
the continuous variability of the classical case.
More on this kind of challenge to SRRT in a moment. First, it might be
objected that even without the Everett view (or similar), the option of producing
a superposition of R = 1 and R = 0 is still available to Nature; a definite
outcome only being needed when Rena makes a measurement. This is true,
but I think of limited use at this point, given the constraints of the problem.
The task is to explain the correlations observed between inputs and outputs,
in a quantum device of the kind depicted in Figure 6; and the issue is whether
an explanation can be given using a time-symmetric intermediate dynamics
14Or, perhaps more subtly, to deny sense to the question of the existence of such a reality.
14
and ontology, without admitting retrocausality. We have noted that in the
analogous classical problem in Figure 5, the solution depends on the fact that
the outputs may be continuously distributed between R = 1 and R = 0. In the
quantum case, it is no help that superposition may provide continuity “inside
the black box,” so long as the experimental outputs themselves remain discrete.
The Everett view gets off the hook by denying that the experimental outputs
really are discrete, at the global level. Where there is discreteness in the final
conditions of the experiment, however, it doesn’t seem to make any difference
whether it appears at the time the photon encounters the polarizer, or at some
later time.
For the Everett view, the wave function provides Nature with all the flex-
ibility She needs to absorb the consequences of changes in σR, within a time-
symmetric ontology, without requiring that they show up at earlier times. And
the trick is available to any view that takes an ontological view of the wave
function – so long as it does not throw the advantage away, by allowing the
wave function to collapse! In particular, therefore, it is available to the de
Broglie-Bohm (dBB) view,15 despite the fact that this theory also provides dis-
crete outputs and inputs. Like Everettians, Bohmians can consistently combine
time-symmetric dynamics and ontology with one-way causality, at least so far
as TSAR is concerned.16
However, to say that this combination is consistent, from a Bohmian point
of view, is not yet to recommend it – even by Bohmian lights. Do Bohmians
actually have good reason to think that causality in these experiments is entirely
one-way? And if so, echoing a concern we raised in §5.3, are there good reasons
to break the symmetry in one direction rather than the other? I shall return to
this issue in §7 below.
6.1 Making the best case for TSAR?
We have noted that SRRT can be rejected, without resorting to instrumentalism,
so long as quantum ontology provides the continuity required to ensure that all
changes Rena makes to σR can be taken up in the future (thereby avoiding the
need for retrocausal changes). The wave function in Everettian and (most) dBB
models provides this continuity in the ontology; and hence TSAR has no direct
bite, in these cases.
Addressing the issue from the other end, what is the best way to make a
case for TSAR? In my view, it is to begin with a naive operational viewpoint,
treating measurement outcomes as real and definite, and as the primary data
to be explained; and being at best sceptical concerning claims that in some far-
reaching sense, the ontology of the macroscopic world is anything other than
it seems to be. When this starting point is combined with realism – that is,
15Or at least to most versions of dBB: in some versions, the wave function may not be ontic,
in the required sense.
16I am setting aside the question as to whether the dBB approach can be applied to photons.
One justification for this concession is that the argument of §3.2 could be recast in terms of
spin.
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for these purposes, with the project of trying to understand what microscopic
reality could account for the observed correlations at the level of measurements
– then TSAR demonstrates that retrocausality emerges in a natural way from
time-symmetry and intuitive causality. The beable structure required for a local
causal explanation of correlations between sequential measurements inevitably
introduces retrocausality, when made time-symmetric.
Once again, this case for retrocausality can be avoided by adding an element
to the ontology which is not there in the naive picture, and which departs a
considerable distance from the naive picture – a real wave function, surviving
measurement. But since it has not previously been appreciated just how directly
retrocausality arises from any time-symmetric naive model, it seems premature,
to say the least, to take the fact that TSAR can be evaded by these means as
a reason for thinking that it should be ignored – and all the more so, because
most of the standard reasons for thinking that a naive realist picture won’t work
in QM (i.e., the No Hidden Variable theorems) have themselves assumed that
there is no retrocausality.
This case for not rushing hastily from “can” to “should” (with respect to
the possibility of avoiding the implications of TSAR) might be strengthened if
we could challenge the presumption that an Everettian or dBB view does avoid
retrocausality. If it does not avoid it, after all, then this way of escaping the
implications of TSAR would be a case of out of the frying pan, into the fire,
from the point of view of an opponent of retrocausality.
Indeed, there is a prospect of an interesting dilemma for opponents of retro-
causality, if the extra “non-naive” ontology needed to block TSAR automati-
cally makes it impossible to exclude retrocausality on observational grounds (by
putting it “out of sight,” as it were). With this prospect in mind, I now turn
to an issue deferred above. What grounds, if any, can an advocate of the dBB
view offer that such a theory is not retrocausal, in its usual form?17
7 Retrocausality in de Broglie-Bohm?
TSAR shows that “intuitive” one-way causality must fail, given time-symmetry,
in some versions of a QM account of photon polarization. While the dBB theory
is not one of those versions, escaping an argument for the conclusion that the
intuitive view is mistaken is not the same as offering an argument that it is
not mistaken. It is unclear what form the latter argument might take, for a
proponent of the dBB view. To address these issues, we need to step back a bit,
and think about what is at stake. One of the attractions of examples like that
of Figure 6 is that they make it easy to pose the relevant questions, without
surreptitiously introducing a bias in one direction or other. The symmetries of
the model make any bias easily visible.
Intuitive causality clearly involves such a bias: we find it natural to say
that if Rena had chosen a different setting, that difference would have made
no difference to the photon arriving from the left, but might have affected the
17I set aside for the present the corresponding issue for the Everettian case.
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result to the right; but very unnatural to say that if Lena had chosen a different
setting, that difference would have made no difference to the photon departing
to the right, but might have affected the input from the left. We have seen that
if the ontology is time-symmetric, and the outputs at R = 1 and R = 0 are
discrete in the relevant sense, this asymmetry is unsustainable – we are forced
to revise our view about Rena’s case. But where does the intuitive bias come
from in the first place? And what reason, if any, do we have in continuing to
take it for granted, in a case such as the dBB theory (where abandoning it is
not forced on us)?
Our simple model helps with the first of these questions. In the classical
case, the obvious difference between Lena and Rena is that Lena controls both
the σL and the inputs L = 1 and L = 0; whereas Rena controls only the
setting σR. We introduced the Demon in order to restore symmetry, but what
breaks symmetry, normally, is the fact that there is no Demon: on the contrary,
experimenters often control their inputs, too.18
But if this is the right story about the source of the bias in the classical case,
it seems to cast doubt on our entitlement to retain the bias, in the single-photon
case. Intuitively, Lena does have enough control over the classical input beams
to ensure that they would have been the same (from the same directions, with
the same intensities and the same polarizations), if she had chosen a different
measurement setting. She does not have enough control over the behaviour of
a single-photon source to ensure that the same photon would have entered the
apparatus, with the same properties, if she had chosen a different measurement
setting. Intuitive causality tells us that a different setting wouldn’t have made
any difference; but in this case, unlike in the classical case, the intuition isn’t
backed up by anything that Lena can actually do.
It might be objected that Lena can do something almost as useful, even in
the QM case. She can ensure that no photons enter the apparatus through (say)
the L = 0 channel, by simply blocking that channel. Or, if it is objected that
this does not exclude thermal photons emitted from the screen itself, she can
provide a photon source on the L = 1 of sufficient intensity to guarantee that
most photons arrive via that channel.
But if this explains the intuitive causal asymmetry, then the asymmetry
should disappear if we deprive Lena of this ability – e.g., if we assume that the
inputs to Lena’s apparatus are provided by thermal radiation, with no built-
in preference for one channel or the other. Yet intuition still seems to tell us
that Lena’s choices still make a difference to the photon between the polarizers,
whereas Rena’s do not. Is this a mistake? And if not, where does this persistent
asymmetry come from?
Furthermore, note that it would not be an option at this point to try to
restore symmetry by denying that Lena’s choices make a difference to the photon
between the polarizers. In that case, the only place to absorb the differences
associated with Lena’s choices would be in the inputs, and so we would be
granting Lena retrocausal influence over those inputs. The only way to avoid
18A fact which relies on the availability of low entropy sources, presumably.
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such retrocausal influence on Lena’s part is to insist that her choices make
a difference exclusively in the future. But then symmetry would imply that
Rena’s choices would make a difference exclusively in the past – so we still face
the problem of grounding an asymmetry, if we are to avoid retrocausality, in
one place or other.
If we wish to insist on this intuitive causal asymmetry, even in the case in
which we explicitly exclude the kind of bias introduced by allowing Lena access
to low-entropy sources, then there seem to be three possible explanations of its
origins:
1. Some asymmetry in initial conditions, other than the usual thermody-
namic asymmetry in the sources Lena would normally be taken to control.
2. Some dynamical asymmetry in the theory itself.
3. Some conventional asymmetry, governing the causal or counterfactual rea-
soning we use in considering what depends on what.
Let us explore these options in reverse order.
The third option has some plausibility, in my view, as an account of the
time-asymmetry of much of the kind of causal and counterfactual reasoning we
employ in ordinary life (see, e.g., [16], [18], [20]). But it is entirely irrelevant
here, where the question is whether there are any good grounds for excluding
HV models for QM involving the kind of lawlike correlations between HVs and
later measurement settings that have been called “retrocausal.” Option (3)
might reveal that this is a poor name for the view, but it provides no reason
whatsoever to deny the existence of such correlations themselves. In particular,
it provides no reason for a proponent of the standard dBB view to the deny
the existence of such correlations, within the standard dBB framework. (In
other words, a proponent of dBB who is convinced that her view excludes such
correlations must have something other than Option (3) in mind.)
But Option (2) is off the table, in the case of the standard dBB view, because
the dynamics is not time-asymmetric. So the only remaining option is (1) – i.e.,
to appeal to some further asymmetry of initial conditions, of a kind not excluded
by the elimination of special initial conditions related to the thermodynamic
asymmetry. But how are we to justify such conditions? And to show that they
are at all in tension with violations of Independence? (It won’t do to appeal
to the familiar causal asymmetry, if the familiar causal asymmetry relies on
something else entirely, namely, the low entropy initial conditions available in
typical experiments.)
So far as I can see, there is nowhere else for the dBB view to turn at this
point, in defence of the claim that the theory is not retrocausal, in its standard
form. Once the role of special initial conditions related to the thermodynamic
asymmetry is factored out, any remaining prohibition on retrocausality is merely
put in by hand, with no substantial justification whatsoever. Given the distinc-
tive ontology of the dBB view, the required assumption needs to be put in at two
points, apparently: it needs to be assumed that neither the wave function nor
the initial positions of the particles are affected by later measurement choices.
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In the absence of any apparent justification for these assumptions, I con-
clude that while dBB blocks TSAR, it doesn’t thereby exclude retrocausality,
in the sense of interest in QM. It blocks an argument from time-symmetry to
retrocausality, but this is not the same excluding retrocausality itself.19
Intriguingly, there are hints of an argument for the opposite conclusion –
for the view that the dBB theory should reject intuitive causality at the fun-
damental level, in favour of a symmetric picture. Goldstein and Tumulka [11]
offer a dBB “toy model” in which microcausal retrocausality provides a Lorentz-
invariant explanation of the Bell correlations. This model differs in some ways
from other retrocausal proposals (e.g., [4]–[8], [10], [12]–[16], [22]–[26]) for rec-
onciling these correlations with special relativity, but the underlying strategy is
exactly the same: zig-zag causality, retrocausal on one arm, provides a decom-
position of Bell’s spacelike correlations into a product of timelike correlations.20
Suppose it were to turn out that abandoning intuitive causality at the fun-
damental level, in favour of a causally symmetric picture, provided a successful
route to a Lorentz-invariant formulation of the dBB theory; and that we were
convinced that this was the only way to make the theory Lorentz-invariant. We
would then have a basis for an analogue of the argument of §3.2, within the
dBB framework, in which Lorentz-invariance played the role of Discreteness:
if Nature is constrained to be Lorentz-invariant, She simply does not have the
option of absorbing all counterfactual changes of σR in the future, but must
allow Rena a degree of output-independent control of the past.21
7.1 The textbook model, again
Finally, I would like to note that most of these considerations apply to the
textbook model of QM, with the Projection Postulate, as well as to dBB. We
observed in §5.3 that because the textbook model is explicitly time-asymmetric,
it evades TSAR. However, as we have just emphasised with respect to dBB,
avoiding an argument that entails retrocausality is not the same as establishing
that there is no retrocausality – it is necessary but not sufficient, as it were.
The discussion in this section seems to apply with almost equal force to the
textbook model as it does to dBB. The one difference, I think, is that because the
dynamics of the textbook model are not time-symmetric, we cannot immediately
exclude option 2 above, as an explanation of the intuitive causal asymmetry. But
a little reflection suggests that the dynamical time-asymmetry of the textbook
model – i.e., the Projection Postulate itself – is of entirely the wrong character
19For present purposes, I am setting aside the suggestion that retrocausality can be excluded
on the grounds that it conflicts with free will. See [16], [9], for some critical discussion of this
point. In the present context, I don’t know any proponent of the dBB view who maintains
that it is our knowledge of our own free will that establishes that the dBB theory is entitled
to the additional assumptions required to ensure that it is not retrocausal.
20The main difference is that in the proposal in [11], the zig-zag goes initially via the future,
rather than initially via the past (see [11], Figure 4, p. 563).
21For a friend of retrocausality, it would be an enormously satisfying result if two of the
great lessons of Einstein’s annus mirabilis, the quantisation of light and Lorentz-invariance,
were to converge in this way, in support of a realist view of the quantum world.
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for the purpose. To rule out retrocausality, we need to show that changing
a measurement setting – e.g., in our experiment, the value of σR – does not
change the earlier state of the system measured. The Projection Postulate is
simply silent on this matter: it specifies the state after a measurement, but says
nothing about the state before a measurement. As in the case of dBB, then, the
textbook model’s assumption that the state function is independent of future
measurement settings seems simply to be put in by hand, in practice.22
8 Summary
We began by noting the claim that time-symmetry favours retrocausality in QM;
and the counter-argument that classical physics seems to permit time-symmetry
without retrocausality and that it isn’t clear why QM should be different. We
have now offered an argument that shows that QM is different, under some
assumptions about quantum ontology. However, we have also noted that these
assumptions are far from compulsory: they are rejected, in one way or another,
by several interpretations of QM.
To put this conclusion in perspective, it is worth stressing that the relative
merits of the views of QM that reject these assumptions – e.g., instrumentalist
views, on one hand, or the Everett and dBB views, on the other – depend on
the demerits of alternative approaches. In particular, they depend on the issue
of the viability of the HV program, in the “just the particles” sense – views
which combine the HV program with an epistemic view of the quantum state.
The present result contributes to clarifying this issue, in the following sense.
As we have noted, Bell’s Theorem and other No Hidden Variable results rely on
the assumption that HVs are independent of future measurement settings – an
assumption with considerable intuitive appeal, against the background of the
one-way causality familiar in ordinary life.
However, the present argument shows that within the framework to which
such an HV program is committed – a framework in which discreteness is not
offset by non-epistemic continuity at the level of the wave function – a blanket
prohibition on retrocausality is incompatible with time-symmetry, in a man-
ner specific to the QM case. This provides a new reason for re-examining the
assumption in question, and for exploring HV approaches that relax it. The
photon polarization experiment discussed in §3.2 may offer a useful model for
investigating these questions, under the assumptions of time-symmetry and dis-
crete outputs.23
22See [21] for a retrocausal approach that exploits this fact, by allowing that the initial wave
function may indeed depend on what happens to a system in the future.
23See [9] for further relevant discussion of this case, developed by means of an analogy with
a photon polarization version of the EPR-Bohm experiment; and [19] for a more abstract
approach to the general project of retrocausal modelling.
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